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ABSTRACT 
Punishment Without Crime?   
Prison as a Worker-Discipline Device* 
 
An ‘efficiency wage’ model developed for Western economies is reinterpreted 
for Soviet Russia assuming that it was the Gulag not unemployment that acted 
as a ‘worker-discipline device’. Archival data now available allows for a basic 
account of the dynamics of the Gulag to be estimated. When this is combined 
with a dictatorship wishing to maximise the ‘investible surplus’ subject to an 
efficiency wage incentive constraint, what does it imply? That to secure 
resources for investment or war, consumption must be compressed; and 
making the Gulag harsher helps reduce incentive problems in the workplace. 
This is the cruel logic of coercion. But this economic rationale for the Gulag 
does not, we find, encompass randomised mass terror. Why did Stalin’s 
system of coercion ultimately fail? The paper concludes with comparisons of 
Western and Soviet systems from an efficiency wage perspective. 
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Non-technical Summary  
 
In the 1930s, when Western economies were laid low by mass unemployment, Stalin could 
claim to have found a cure: a command economy with ambitious five-year plans to catch up 
with the West by rapid industrialisation. Massive capital investment ensured no shortage of 
aggregate demand: the problem was how to compress consumption. 
 
Supply-side incentives 
Stalin was planning for great increases in productivity through rapid industrialisation and 
collectivisation. But how was he to motivate workers with low levels of skill – including 
millions pouring in from the countryside entirely lacking in training or experience of the rigour 
and rhythms of life in a factory or on a construction site? By extending coercion to promoting 
supply as well as creating demand is the answer explored in this paper, using an efficiency 
wage approach. For, as Stalin told the Party Congress in 1927, “Our plans are not prognoses, 
guess-plans, but instructions, which are compulsory”. 1 
  
The growth of the Gulag  
A brief overview and discussion of data now available on the custodial population in the USSR 
from 1917 to 1953, is followed by estimating a simple model of inflows and outflows into 
custody, including step-shifts to account for the Great Terror and for releases to the front 
during the Second World War. The idea is to combine this with an efficiency wage constraint 
and a dictator who wishes to maximise investible surplus.   
 
Asymmetric information, property rights and ‘efficiency wages’ 
The efficiency wage theory we appeal to focuses on the problem of workers ‘shirking’ when 
information is asymmetric; such incentive problems were rife in a Soviet labour market 
featuring full employment. Appeal can be made to the ‘Coase theorem’ to show that either 
rewards or punishments can elicit effort, so long as property rights are appropriately 
determined. With wages held down to promote massive investment, the system had to depend 
on the stick rather than the carrot. But without high efficiency wages, how can incentives be 
preserved? From a Coasian perspective, shirkers could, in principle, be fined for failure to 
supply effort (and some such financial penalties were used); in practice, of course, workers on 
low wages simply cannot pay. 
                                                 
1 Overy, 2004, p.406. 
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 The logic of coercion  
The alternative is to extend the command economy yet further – by using prison as an 
economic discipline device for shirking. Prisoners must be made to work, both to make them 
better citizens (‘corrective work’) and to augment the supply of goods; and if investment plans 
call for lower wages, prison conditions can be made more harsh. According to Gregory and 
Harrison (2005): “The effectiveness of the Politburo accumulation model rested on the 
dictator’s ability to create a gap between the civilian wage as a ‘fair’ return for effort, and low 
subsistence in the Gulag as the return to shirking, so that the difference between them was the 
intended punishment for shirking”. This is the logic of coercion embodied in our efficiency 
wage analysis.  
 
The framework we use is based Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) for Western economies where 
workers are paid to put in effort, and failure to do so (shirking) leads to loss of employment 
and income. In our analysis, however, custodial sentences with corrective work in the Gulag 
replace spells of unemployment-on-benefit as the ‘worker-discipline device’.  
 
The objective of maximising investible funds yields an equilibrium level of civilian 
employment, where the dictator exercises monopsony power to employ labour at the efficiency 
wage and no higher: those not so employed go to the Gulag. As an exercise in positive 
economics, the approach we take is brutally simplistic; but it focuses clearly on the issue of 
incentives, and provides equilibria where coercion replaces cash as an incentive device. The 
logic of coercion implies that investment can be further increased by reducing living standards 
in the Gulag. The predictions appear, moreover, broadly consistent with Sokolov’s (2003) 
argument that the solutions Stalin adopted involved a time-varying mix of coercion, moral 
suasion, and material incentives.  
 
Russian Roulette?  
Coercion as a discipline device helped Russia to industrialise at high speed – and to produce 
the arms needed to defeat Hitler: but, like the French Revolution, the regime of punishment 
became a monster. The archival data we draw on bear witness to the extent and longevity of 
the Gulag system developed and sustained under Stalin’s dictatorship – to say nothing of the 
settlements to contain more than two million kulaks.  
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The frenzy of punishment in the late 1930s may have served political purposes, but the 
economic rationale for the Gulag does not, we find, encompass randomised terror for political 
ends. Our efficiency wage model implies – as seems to be the case – that random terror is 
economically counter-productive: so too the random application of coercive labour laws. 
Stalin’s successors realised this, and the Gulag system and the harsh labour laws were 
dismantled soon after he died.  
 
Why did the system finally fail?  
How the command system survived for another quarter of a century is not something 
considered here. But the efficiency wage framework may be used to speculate briefly on why it 
finally failed. The inefficient use of the investible resources squeezed from the economic 
system, together with sluggish technical progress, meant that labour productivity in the Soviet 
system failed to catch up with the West. Furthermore, in an increasingly globalised 
environment where respect for human rights has been endorsed by all members of the United 
Nations including the USSR, the logic of coercion – that increased state spending requires 
wage restraint and productive efficiency calls for greater harshness of punishment – was much 
less acceptable. The effect of this on efficiency wages -  together with a rise in monitoring 
costs as the structure of production shifted to services - put the command system under 
pressure. Add robust competition from the West, in military as well as in economic terms, and 
the logic of coercion could easily reach breaking point.  
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                                    ……    riches, poverty, 
And use of service, none; contract, succession, 
Bourn, bound of land, tilth, vineyard, none; 
No use of metal, corn, or wine, or oil; 
No occupation; all men idle, all;  
And women too 
 
Shakespeare The Tempest Act 2, scene 1  
 
 
 
Introduction 
At a time when Western economies were plagued by mass unemployment, Josef Stalin could 
rightly claim to have found a cure: a command economy with ambitious five year plans to 
catch up with the West by rapid industrialisation. Massive capital investment ensured no 
shortage of aggregate demand: the problem was how to compress consumption. 
 
But those who would create  Utopia without private property rights must confront the issue of 
incentives. This is evident from Gonzalo’s vision of Utopia, cited above. For old Gonzalo the 
anticipated solution was natural abundance, produced “without sweat or endeavour”.2 But 
Stalin, for his part, was planning for great increases in productivity through rapid 
industrialisation and collectivisation. How was he to motivate workers with low levels of skill, 
including “millions pouring in from the countryside entirely lacking in training or experience 
of the rigour and rhythms of life in a factory or on a construction site” (Acton and Stableford, 
2005, p.315)? 
 
How was Stalin to elicit the necessary ‘sweat and endeavour’ from his compatriots? 
‘Efficiency wage’ theories may provide answers. Akerlof and Yellen (1990), for example, 
emphasise how worker motivation depends on whether employers are seen as good, and wages 
perceived as fair. This is the approach adopted to study incentives under Stalin by Gregory 
(2003), who uses it to explain the trade-offs involved in choosing between consumption and 
investment in the command economy. In Gregory’s model, workers’ effort depends positively 
on the wage (or consumption level) they receive, up to the point where they are paid the ‘fair 
wage’ and supply their ‘full’ labour effort. A dictator, wishing to maximise investment in the 
                                                 
2 His companions were not convinced; nor, one assumes, was Shakespeare – shareholder of his theatre company 
and owner of the second most expensive residence in Stratford.  
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face of output constraints that force him to choose between investment and consumption, will 
pick a wage lying below the ‘fair wage’, but above a ‘strike wage’ at which workers will 
withdraw their labour. Gregory discusses how Stalin realised that consumption had to be 
increased to counter declining productivity in the early 1930s: and how he attempted to 
manipulate the fair wage by “promises of a brighter future”.3 
 
The efficiency wage theory of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1989), on the other hand, focuses on 
asymmetric information and ‘shirking’. Assuming the supply of effort is all or nothing, the 
worker is paid to put in effort, but failure to do so (‘shirking’) leads to loss of employment and 
income. Wages will need to exceed unemployment benefits by enough to preserve incentives 
for effort; but with imperfect monitoring of effort, incentive problems require the payment of 
‘efficiency wages’ much exceeding the cost of effort-plus-benefit; and the maintenance of 
persistent unemployment as a ‘worker-discipline device’.4 (Ironically, however, if 
unemployment acts successfully as a discipline device, there will be no shirkers among the 
unemployed, just those moving between jobs.) 
 
Even a dictator has to solve endemic problems of asymmetric information,5 as Stalin was soon 
to learn. Although the first Five Year Plan was launched “with a wave of attacks on managers 
and specialists suspected of harbouring alien class sympathies”, this was found to be 
“incompatible with the discipline drive, given their direct involvement in monitoring labour 
performance and implementing measures to designed to raise productivity”; and there was a 
sharp change of policy in 1931 (Acton and Stableford, 2005, p.316).  
 
The Soviet system depended not so much on the carrot as on the stick (Harrison, 2002); but 
one can appeal to the ‘Coase theorem’ (1960) to show that either rewards or punishments can 
elicit effort, so long as property rights are appropriately determined. If labour power is 
effectively owned by the state, workers need not be rewarded for supplying effort. But without 
high efficiency wages, how are incentives to be preserved?  From a Coasian perspective, 
                                                 
3 Gregory (2003) also mentions the possible use of forced labour to incentivise workers, the principle idea 
developed in this paper. 
4 The loss of wages in suffering a spell of unemployment when caught and fired must be great enough to stop 
shirking; they show that the efficiency wage has to increase sharply as unemployment shrinks; and is also 
increasing in the level of non-incentive-related job losses. 
5 The incentive problems arising from asymmetric information are central to Stiglitz’s critique of the Soviet 
system in Whither Socialism? (1994). 
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shirkers could, in principle, be fined for failure to supply effort (and some such financial 
penalties were used); but in practice, of course, workers on low wages simply cannot pay. 
 
Another solution is to extend the command economy yet further. This is the avenue we explore 
in this paper. It is an avenue that ultimately leads to the Gulag Archipelago,6 for the discipline 
device we consider is non-pecuniary deprivation – imprisonment in particular. Custodial 
sentences (with compulsory work) replace spells of low income and unemployment as an 
economic discipline device for shirking. As Gregory and Harrison (2005, p.740) note in their 
survey of allocation under dictatorship: “The effectiveness of the Politburo accumulation 
model rested on the dictator’s ability to create a gap between the civilian wage as a ‘fair’ return 
for effort, and low subsistence in the Gulag as the return to shirking, so that the difference 
between them was the intended punishment for shirking”.  
 
A brief overview and discussion of data now available on the custodial population in the USSR 
from 1917 to 1953, is followed by a simplified econometric account of inflows and outflows 
into custody.  This account is then combined with an efficiency wage model developed in 
Sections 2 and 3, where the Shapiro and Stiglitz model of incentives is adapted to fit Soviet 
forms of coercion. The objective of maximising investible funds yields an equilibrium where 
the dictator exercises monopsony power to employ labour at the efficiency wage and no 
higher: but the logic of coercion implies that investment can be further increased by reducing 
living standards in the Gulag.  
 
Broadly speaking, we examine the problem of maintaining incentives given that property rights 
reside with the state. Some observers, Kornai in particular, have argued that - in a wider 
analysis of the political economy of communism - the system of property rights was 
endogenous: that it was chosen so as to promote the power of centralised dictatorship.7 
Tackling this wider issue is not the purpose of this paper;8 but we can say that the economic 
rationale for prison as a discipline device does not extend to Stalin’s unleashing of the Great 
Terror. How could the resulting mass executions and wholesale imprisonment help the 
economy? How could a dictator whose interests were to promote economic efficiency endorse 
a ‘monitoring rule’ where a success rate of only 5% was enough to justify denunciation?  
                                                 
6 Solzhenitsyn (1974). 
7 Kornai (1992) argues that the collectivisation of agriculture, in Soviet Russia and elsewhere, showed political 
imperatives being given precedence over economic objectives.  
8 Skidelsky (1995), Wintrobe (1998) and Gregory et al (2006) all provide interesting political economy 
perspectives.  
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As to why Stalin’s system of coercion ultimately failed, we conclude with speculation based on 
the efficiency wage approach. 
 
 
1. Data on ‘corrective work’ and on custodial population  
While Shapiro and Stiglitz consider unemployment as a worker discipline device, it is clear 
that it could not perform that role in the Soviet system: by the early 1930s the Soviet 
government could rightly claim that unemployment was “liquidated” (Rogachevskaya, 1973).9 
The proposition to be considered is that coercion not idleness was the discipline device in the 
Soviet case. But, as Sherlock Holmes warned Dr. Watson: “It is a capital mistake to theorize 
before one has data”.10  
 
Non-custodial punishment 
Imprisonment was not the only discipline device open to the Soviet courts: the Coasian 
alternative of punishment via financial penalty was also used. What was termed ‘corrective 
work’ was quite common throughout the 1930s, constituting 48 per cent of all court sentences 
in 1935, for example (Getty et al, 1993, p.1020).11 Typically, offenders were condemned to up 
to one year’s ‘corrective labour’, the penalty consisting of work typically at the usual place of 
employment, with a reduction in the wage of up to 25 per cent and loss of credit for this service 
towards the length of service that gave rights to non-wage benefits such as vacation or pension 
(Getty et al, 1993, p.1020; Sokolov, 2003, p.32). The several laws on labour discipline passed 
in the late 1930s and early 1940s increased the numbers given non-custodial sentences, but in 
relative terms the proportion sent to prison rose.12  
 
 
Emergence of the Gulag Archipelago   
                                                 
9 There were some people in the labour force without work, but “under conditions of socialism, the condition of 
being without work (nezaniatost’) is not a synonym for ‘unemployment’. It means only an interruption of work 
caused by reasons of a private character (family circumstances, changes of location)” Kotliar (1983, p.9). 
10 In A Scandal in Bohemia (Conan Doyle, 1992, p.14).  
11 Solomon (1980) describes how the non-custodial sanction of what was then known as ‘compulsory work’ had 
been used extensively since the start of the Bolshevik regime. In 1923, only 20 per cent of those convicted in a 
criminal court were sent to prison; 25 per cent were sentenced to compulsory work (p.198). However, by 1926 the 
proportion sent to prison had risen to 40%, due to a change in the type of crimes coming before the courts and 
because judges began avoiding sentences of compulsory work that were not being properly carried out, in part 
because of the then high unemployment (p.204). 
12 From 20 per cent in 1930, to 37.8 per cent in 1934, to 55 per cent in 1938, and to more than two thirds in 1940 
(Solomon, 1980, p.216), despite there being 1.7 million non-custodial sentences in 1940 (Getty et al, 1993, 
p.1020). 
 8
After Stalin and his allies took control of the Politburo in 1928-9, and after the decision to 
forcibly collectivise the peasants in 1929, numbers in custody began to rise inexorably. Chart 1 
provides an overview of the numbers in custody over the years 1917 to 1953 (excluding 
settlements), with detailed figures and sources provided in Appendix 1. Note that in the text we 
use the term ‘prison’ to encompass the whole of the Gulag system, generally understood to 
include prisons, colonies and camps.13 (The data do not include figures for the mass executions 
characteristic of Stalin’s system – to be treated as symptoms of political repression and 
paranoia, not acts of labour-discipline, Wintrobe, 1998, Chapter 2). 
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Chart 1: USSR custodial population, 1917-1953 
Note: Data on prisons cover 1938-1948. 
 
“The concept of economic sabotage was built into the Soviet Criminal Code of 1926. Any act 
of negligence or obstruction in the process of producing and distributing goods was defined as 
a counter-revolutionary crime, with penalties ranging from one year in jail to execution by 
shooting. During the First Five-year Plan additional laws were passed against the production of 
shoddy goods, against malpractice in retail stores and against state theft, all of them carrying 
penalties of between five and ten years in a camp” (Overy, 2004, p.435). The Law of 
Corrective Labour Camps of 1930 placed all camps and colonies in the control of the Gulag, 
                                                 
13 Gulag is an acronym for the Administration of Corrective Labour Camps and Colonies. 
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and the harsher sentencing after 1930 brought small-time crooks into the Gulag system so that 
by 1934, when the NKVD14 took charge of the camp system, around half a million were in 
custody (Overy, 2004). The NKVD tightened security and supervision, the possibility of 
escape diminished and the numbers imprisoned more than doubled in a couple of years. Thus 
the proportion of the working population imprisoned rose from 0.9% to 1.2% between 1934 
and 1936 (when employment was 57.7m and 62.3m respectively).  
 
The Great Terror 
Imprisonment may act as a worker discipline device; but it was also used as an instrument of 
political power, with people being punished not for lack of effort but for ideological reasons. 
According to Lazarev (2003, p.191): “The Gulag came into its own with the beginning of the 
Great Terror in 1937, when the upsurge in political prisoners drastically increased the 
population of the archipelago … As the morose product of the tyrant’s paranoia, its main goal 
was to accommodate growing numbers of repressed opponents of the regime and ‘socially 
alien elements’ (like wealthy farmers and priests), while the economic use of prison labor was 
simply a by-product of the main political purpose”.15 
 
The ‘mass operations’ of the Great Terror lasted from July 1937 until November 1938.16 
How the episode got its name – and the political drive behind it - becomes clear from the 
statistics. Not only did the number of arrests rise during the Terror, but the conviction rate also 
rose – from around one third in 1930 to 85 per cent in 1937 (Gregory et al, 2006, p.19). The 
result, as Chart 2 demonstrates for camps, was a huge rise in admissions to the prison system. 
There was no countervailing rise in releases – indeed, releases fell during the Terror – resulting 
in a 21 per cent increase in the Gulag camp population between January 1, 1937 and January 1, 
1938, and an increase of 32 per cent the following year. Estimates vary, but even 
(conservative) data from the Soviet Archive show that, from a working population of 66 
million,17 1.4 million (over 2%) had been convicted by 1 November 1938, of whom about half 
were executed (Khlevnyuk, forthcoming). 
                                                 
14 People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs – the secret police. 
15 Furthermore, as Overy (2004) observes, to merit punishment under Stalin’s rule, it was not necessary to have 
committed an offence; it was enough that those in power thought you might do so on some future occasion. 
16 During 1935-1936, Stalin had targeted the political elite, the three Moscow Show Trials enabling him to get rid 
of political rivals. In various communications and decrees of July 1937, Stalin formulated plans for a terror 
campaign initially planned to start on August 5 and to last four months. Initial ‘limits’ for arrests and executions 
and the duration of the campaign had to be rapidly revised upwards to meet requests by local officials (Gregory et 
al, 2006). 
17 In 1937. 
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Chart 2 Admissions and releases: 1934-1947 
Notes: Though strictly speaking it lasted from July 1937 until November 1938, the Great Terror is shown as 1937 
and 1938. Likewise, War is shown as 1941-1945, though the War in Europe ended in early May 1945, and the 
War in the Pacific ended in August that year. That most observations lie above the 45 degree line of balance 
tallies with the inexorable expansion of the Gulag; but note that the dynamics of the prison population must also 
take account of deaths, executions and escapes not included in the chart. 
 
Between 1937 and 1940, there was a four-fold increase in the number of political prisoners as 
Stalin purged civil society of counter-revolutionary elements (see Table 3 in the Appendix). At 
the height of the Great Terror, political prisoners accounted for around one third of the camp 
population. Political prisoners were charged under Article 58 of the Criminal Code, which 
allowed significant discretion in who to include among ‘enemies’.18 
 
Stalin also used the administrative and legal system to increase labour discipline. To cope with 
absenteeism, lateness, drunkenness and high job turnover, tougher administrative measures 
were introduced in 1938,19 and, between 1939 and 1940, new laws turned absence from work, 
                                                 
18 Article 58 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic was set out in 1927 to cover 
the arrest of suspected counter-revolutionaries (‘traitors’, ‘enemies of workers’, and ‘saboteurs’) and the 
categories were extended in 1934 and 1937. Flexibility arose in large part due to the offence of non-reporting, e.g. 
of anti-Soviet activities. 
19 “On December 20, 1938, the Council of People’s Commissars (the highest state body) approved the decree ‘On 
the obligatory introduction of work books in all enterprises and institutions,’ a law designed to attack labor 
turnover and to reduce the free movement of labor among enterprises. Labor contracts were increased to five-year 
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tardiness, drunkenness and hooliganism into crimes20 punished by up to four months in jail 
(Solomon, 1980, p.217). These draconian new measures affected huge numbers: almost 1.8 
million workers were convicted of absenteeism or lateness of more than 20 minutes in 1940 – 
more than two thirds of all criminal convictions (Solomon, 1996, p.299); and there were over 
4.5 million convictions during 1940-1942 (Sokolov, 2003, Table 2.1, p.28).21 
 
War and Post War 
From a peak of over two million during the Great Terror, the numbers in custody fell to a 
million and a third by 1944. This was in large measure due to a step increase in the release 
rates connected with the war effort, see Chart 2. (Almost one million detainees were released to 
military service, often to the ‘storm’ units which suffered the heaviest casualties.)  For those 
left in the Gulag during the war, moreover, the mortality rate was extremely high: from 1941 to 
1945, 1,005,000 inmates died in camps and colonies (Khlevnyuk, 2003, p.51), due to scarce 
rations and the fact that the most able-bodied had been sent to war. 
 
But after the war was over, the custodial population rapidly resumed its upward march, 
reaching a plateau of two and a half million in 1948. Numbers stayed at this level until Stalin’s 
death in 1953 when more than half of all detainees were released. Pre-war labour discipline 
laws were retained after the war, but labour turnover remained a problem, reaching 34 per cent 
in light industry and 64 per cent in construction (Sokolov, 2003, p.37);22 and a further decree 
combating mobility was issued in 1948. Almost a quarter of a million workers were sentenced 
to jail terms for unauthorised absence, laziness or idleness in 1949; and of the 2.5 million 
imprisoned in the Gulag in 1950, half had been sentenced under the June 1940 labour 
                                                                                                                                                          
terms; all job changes, salary and reward histories, punishments, rebukes, and reasons for firings were registered 
in the labor book, which the cadres department used to evaluate workers’ performance” (Sokolov, 2003, p.25). 
20 “In January of 1939, the Council of People’s Commissars decreed that tardiness of 20 minutes or more 
constituted an unauthorized absence from work. On June 26, 1940, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet approved 
the decree ‘On the transition to an eight hour work day, a seven day work week, and the prohibition of voluntary 
departures of workers from enterprises and institutions.’ The June 1940 law tied the worker to the enterprise and 
introduced criminal punishments for laziness, poor discipline, and tardiness. In August of 1940, criminal 
punishments were introduced for minor workplace infractions, such as drunkenness, hooliganism, and petty theft. 
The October 1940 reforms of vocational education raised the term of obligatory work after graduation to four 
years and prohibited voluntary departures” (Sokolov, 2003, p.25). 
21 Not all of these served prison sentences: according to Sokolov (2003, p.28), there were 955,000 prison 
sentences related to idleness and unauthorised departures during 1940-1941 (many more were sentenced to 
corrective work – see above). But the effect on the population was even bigger than these figures suggest: during 
1940-1941 there were a total of 5.3 million trials for such offences (Sokolov, 2003, pp.27-28), which represents 
2.8 per cent and 4.3 per cent of the workforce, respectively. 
22 Living conditions were poor and were exacerbated by a famine in 1946-47. “A female worker in a Moscow 
plant wrote: ‘We worked hard throughout the war; we awaited the victory and counted on better conditions. The 
opposite occurred. They lowered our salaries and we receive pennies. It is time to think about the workers’.” 
(Sokolov, 2003, p.34). 
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discipline law.23 Labour restrictions were eventually reduced in 1951;24 but they were only 
fully abolished in 1956, after Stalin’s death. 
 
The growth of the Gulag Archipelago: an econometric sketch 
The dynamics of the prison population depends on inflows (reflecting the rate of 
imprisonment) versus outflows (reflecting releases, escapes and deaths in custody). We use 
data on these flows during Stalin’s era to see what they reveal about the dynamics of the prison 
population – and its steady state equilibrium.  
 
On the assumption that the annual inflow rate π and outflow rate  (to denote releases plus 
escapes and deaths) are constant proportions of  prison population P and labour force L, 
respectively, the annual change in the prison population over year t, ΔPt, will be given by 
+ρ
ΔPt = π Lt-1  – Pt-1 + εt where we assume εt is i.i.d. Normal and .+ρ 0>+ρ 25  
Fitting this to the data over the Stalin era, 1928-1953, but including zero-one step dummies to 
account for the Great Terror (1937-1938) and the Great War (1941-1945), gives the following 
parameter estimates:26 
( ) (165,915)                  (240,863)          (0.100)          002.0          
25;20.0545,148384,368209.0006.0 21111 ==−+−=Δ −−−− NRWarTerrorPLP ttttt
 
 
These estimates imply that a little over half of one percent of the civilian labour force were 
incarcerated each year, and around one fifth of prisoners were released (or died in custody), 
these flows averaging just under 400,000 annually. Though the relevant shift dummies are 
statistically not well-determined, they reflect the marked rise in prison admissions during the 
Terror, and of releases during the War. 
 
Dividing through by workforce N, and assuming N to be constant, gives 
                                                 
23 The relative severity of punishment for these offences rose, as the numbers fined fell by half (Sokolov, 2003, 
pp.38 and 41). 
24 By a decree of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of July 14 ‘About the replacement of judicial 
responsibility of workers and employees for idleness, except in the case of multiple and extended absences with 
disciplinary and social actions’ (Sokolov, 2003, p.38). 
25 Annual data are used, so the absolute change in prison population between January 1 in year t-1 and January 1 
in year t is regressed on the labour force and prison population measured on January 1 in year t-1. Note that the 
intercept is zero. 
26 Standard errors are given in parentheses. The model was also estimated using interactions between the Terror 
and War dummies and each of the other variables. Results accorded with priors: estimated inflow and outflow 
rates were significantly higher in the two periods (and much higher during the Terror), and the steady-state annual 
flow at other times was approximately 180,000. But due to the small sample size, we prefer to report results based 
on simple shift dummies. 
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Δp = π  - (π + ρ)p 
where p=P/N and Δp = ΔP/N. So in steady state, where Δp = 0, 
/( )p π π ρ += + . 
The estimated coefficients imply that in equilibrium  p = 0.006 / (0.006+0.209) = 0.029; in 
other words roughly three per cent of the working population would be in prison in steady 
state. During Stalin’s rule the working population (approximated by employment) averaged 67 
million, implying a prison population of 1.95 million – an equilibrium which broadly matches 
the figures after the NKVD took charge in the mid 1930s (see Appendix Table A1).  
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Chart 3 Changes in custodial population: actual and predicted 
 
Chart 3 shows that predictions from the estimated equation broadly track the major swings in 
net admissions, though prison inflows prior to the NKVD taking in 1934 are substantially over-
predicted. (Note, however, that this was when Stalin forcibly re-settled the kulaks;27 and the 
custodial figures we use exclude such resettlements.)  
 
 
                                                 
27 Approximately 2.3 million kulaks were sent for resettlement between 1929 and 1940; of whom 1.8 million were 
sent into exile by the end of 1931 (Ivnitskii, 2004, p.43; Zemskov, 1990). 
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2. Prison as an incentive device  
A simple characterisation of the dynamics of the Gulag system has been provided: but its 
economic rationale will depend largely on its effect on the incentives of those in civilian 
employment outside prison. How to analyse such incentives?  
 
We begin with Shapiro and Stiglitz’s account of how shirking is checked under capitalism. 
It  has three salient characteristics: that the punishment for being caught shirking is to lose 
one’s job; that efficiency wages paid to the employed are a lot higher than effort-plus-benefits 
(as paid to the unemployed – who are not required to work); that this premium rises sharply as 
employment levels increase and unemployment falls. (The reason for the rising premium is that 
the punishment involved in losing one’s job is diminished by the short unemployment duration 
rates prevailing at low levels of unemployment.) Analytical detail of the No Shirking 
Constraint (NSC) that they obtain in this framework is presented in Appendix 2. 
 
As Wintrobe (2000, p.28) remarks, however, ‘The prospect of unemployment is not the only 
possible discipline device’; and, in the context of a two-sector model of labour markets,28 he 
notes that ‘Dismissal poses a threat as long as the worker can fall into the bad jobs sector. Such 
a prospect is sufficient to discipline the labour force.’ Here we consider a Soviet alternative 
where there is no unemployment; but the punishment for those caught shirking is not a ‘bad 
job’ but being sent to a labour camp, where work is compulsory. 
 
Efficiency wages and ‘Dire Punishment’  
Efficiency wages where shirking is treated as a crime meriting imprisonment will surely 
depend on prison conditions and on duration of punishment.  To capture the psychological 
impact of being ‘sent to Siberia’, we begin with the case where imprisonment is seen as the end 
of normal life (labelled ‘dire punishment’, a term used in repeated games to denote a state from 
which there is no transition). As Ertz (2007, p.27) puts it: “For individuals sentenced by the 
Stalinist political or criminal justice, …their chances to turn into ‘Soviet people’ were, if not 
zero, then at least much lower than for the rest of society”.29 
 
                                                 
28 That of Bulow and Summers (1986). 
29 Even after release, an ex-con would not be able to participate normally in society: for example, on release, 
political prisoners had to sign a paper stating that they would never again engage in counter-revolutionary activity, 
were forbidden to live in major cities and had to report to a police station of the NKVD for years afterwards 
(Overy, 2004, p.634). 
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Let w denote the real wage and e denote effort while working, so the welfare of one who works 
is simply w – e, i.e. the excess of wages over effort. Let q denote the hazard rate of being 
detected while shirking (putting in zero effort) and assume those caught shirking are sent to 
prison where the level of welfare is γ = cP – h, i.e. the excess of prison consumption over hard 
labour. The benefit of working versus being in prison will therefore be w – e – γ. (Note that γ 
will be negative if being in prison is worse than being paid just enough to put in effort 
voluntarily outside prison.) 
 
In the dire punishment case, where incarceration is treated as permanent and r denotes the 
discount rate, the (continuous time) ‘no shirking condition’, NSC, is  
( rewqe /)γ−−≤             (1) 
i.e. the benefit of saving on effort for one period must match the risk of losing one’s job and 
being imprisoned for ever. 
 
The ‘efficiency wage’ is where the two are exactly equal, i.e.  
qreew /* ++= γ  ,            (2)  
so it rises with the level of effort and the interest rate; and falls with the efficacy of monitoring 
and with the harshness of prison conditions. Crude as it may be, this can offer insights into 
aspects of the Soviet system. 
  
(a) Shooting the monitor 
During the first Five Year Plan, managers and specialists were harassed and imprisoned for 
ideological reasons, reducing the efficacy of monitoring. Equation (2) shows that a fall in the 
probability of detection q has the immediate effect of raising the efficiency wage, with 
potentially serious incentive effects (considered in more detail below). 
 
It seems that by 1931-1932 Stalin had learnt this lesson, for the policy was then changed. 
“Specialists trained under the old regime, he announced, had seen the light and could now be 
trusted … the authority, status and privileges of the white-collar strata now began to be 
energetically buttressed” (Acton and Stableford, 2005, p.316). 
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(b) Stakhanov’s shovel 
After the celebrated example of Stakhanov, who in 1935 mined far more coal per hour than the 
norm, 30 many managers hoped that others would follow his lead and produce more coal for the 
same wage. But the formula for the efficiency wage confirms that “harder work deserves a 
bigger share of the pie and that the higher wages of Stakhanovites should be passed on to 
ordinary workers” who were also working harder (Gregory, 2003, p.106).31 In fact “ordinary 
workers interpreted the Stakhanovite movement as a plot to extract more work for the same 
wage”, and there was “no perceptible advance in labour productivity during or after the 
Stakhanovite movement, despite the fact that some Stakahnovites raised labour productivity 
substantially” (Gregory, 2003, p.105). 
 
(c) Promises, promises 
In the first and second Five Year Plans, Stalin argued that workers should accept restraints on 
their current wage in return for the promise that – thanks to higher investment – the supply of 
consumer goods would at least double, or perhaps even triple, by the late 1930s. Can the 
efficiency wage be restrained by “visions of a brighter future” (Gregory, 2003, p.97)? 
 
That workers might indeed be willing to accept a lower efficiency wage in return for future 
increases can be seen by augmenting the right hand side of (1) by the term , where 
J is capitalised value of the promised ‘jump’ in wages at time T, appropriately discounted. The 
efficiency condition becomes: 
rJ rT /exp−
( ) rJewqe rT /exp−+−−= γ  ;           (1’) 
and the efficiency wage consequently falls by the present discounted value of the jump, so: 
qerJew rT /exp* +−+= −γ  .           (2’’) 
Promises of a brighter future can, in principle, maintain incentives despite a cut in current 
wages. But for incentives to be preserved, promises must be credible: and credibility became 
strained as the Plans failed to deliver. 
 
 
                                                 
q
30 He cut 102 tons of coal in 5 hours 45 minutes, beating the ‘norm’ of 7 tons by a factor of over 14 (Gregory, 
2003, p.103). 
31 In fact, because of imperfect monitoring, the efficiency wage rises more than one for one with effort, as can be 
seen by differentiating (2) with respect to effort to obtain: * / 1 /w e r∂ ∂ = + . 
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3. Efficiency wages in  coercive equilibrium  
During the Great Terror and afterwards, “Such a wide range of behaviors was criminalized that 
virtually every worker became liable to prosecution for something” (Gregory and Harrison, 
2005, p.739). The random nature of punishment is exemplified by the ‘five per cent rule’ for 
denunciation, which Stalin expressed as follows: ‘Your task is to check people at work and if 
something is not right, you must report it. Every member of the party, honest non-party 
members, citizen of the Soviet Union not only has the right but is obligated to report the 
deficiencies he sees. If they are right, maybe only 5 percent of the time, this is nevertheless 
bread’ (Gregory et al, 2006, p.18).  This seems likely to increase terror more than promote 
detection,32 particularly as there was “an official understanding during the 1937-1938 mass 
operations that a large number of innocent parties were to be convicted” (Gregory et al, 2006, 
p.18).  
 
For workers faced with increased uncertainty concerning their liberty, however, such random 
denunciation (and consequent punishment) will have the opposite effect of brave promises; it 
will reduce the value of a job and increase the efficiency wage. For, assuming that the average 
worker treats these risks of imprisonment as a hazard that arrives randomly at rate dtπ  
independent of effort supplied, the flow of net earnings for a job must be discounted at a higher 
rate, to allow for the risk of random ‘state transition’ as well as the passage of time: 
consequently the rate of discount in equation (1) increases from r to r + π .33 As the value of a 
job falls, so the efficiency wage rises to become  
( ) qerew /* πγ +++= .     (3) 
Thus, in terms of the efficiency wage, random threats of dire punishment militate against 
promises of a bright future. 
 
In equilibrium where wages satisfy this condition, however, no-one will be shirking, so 
admissions to prison will be for political and other reasons. As indicated by the econometrics 
                                                 
32 There was little opportunity or effort made to stem opportunistic voluntary denunciations; denunciations made 
under torture were unreliable, often naming friends or acquaintances. Incentives for officials also promoted 
opportunism: “the NKVD itself opportunistically selected victims with large apartments that became a part of the 
NKVD inventory” (Gregory et al, 2006, p.22, citing Vatlin, 2004).  
33 The parameter π should be interpreted to include not just political repression but also the risk of being caught by 
false denunciation under the ‘five per cent rule’ discussed below and by random applications of labour law. As 
Gregory and Harrison (2005, p.739) note, “A broken-down commuter bus could make criminals of scores of 
hapless workers. Rational managers might wish to select the truly guilty for prosecution, the problem workers and 
repeat offenders, but the laws subjected even petty offenses to harsh penalties and managers who failed to report 
offenses were threatened with the same. As a result, the innocent were bundled through the courts and camps 
along with the guilty in extraordinarily large numbers”. 
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in the previous section, the dynamics of prison population and its steady state will depend on 
the prospect of release (and of death in prison, which occurred on average at about one sixth of 
release rate).34 The effect of incorporating the prospect of release from prison back to a normal 
working life at the rate ρdt35 – so that prison is no longer an absorbing state – is to further 
increase the rate of discount on the RHS of equation (1) and to increase the efficiency wage. A 
higher probability of death in prison will have the opposite effect by reducing the expected 
value of life in the Gulag. So the efficiency wage may be written   
( ) qerew /* πργ ++++=         36        (4) 
where γ has been reduced accordingly.  
 
By treating the rate of admissions as endogenous, as required to maintain the prison population 
constant, we finally obtain the incentive effect relating the efficiency wage to the fraction of 
the labour force in gaol. 
  
Proposition 1 There is a multiplicity of coercive equilibria in which the efficiency wage moves 
inversely to the prison population.  
 
The specific relationship, derived in Appendix 3, involves substituting for ρ  in (4) to give: 
( ) ( ) qeprepw //* πδγ +−++=                            (5) 
The efficiency wage so defined is shown as the schedule labelled NSC in Figure 1(a), sloping 
upwards from its intercept with the vertical axis (where p is unity so (5) yields the constant 
( ) ( ) qerew /1* πδγ +−++=  );  and becoming vertical when the release rate reaches its 
maximum value ρ , as indicated in the lower panel.37  
                                                 
34 Our simplified treatment does not include the impact of executions or escapes. 
35 Note that the lower the release rate, the longer the expected spell in prison, so one could draw an equivalence 
between a model with stochastic release and one with a determinate prison sentence, where ρ is inversely related 
to the length of sentence. 
36  The other method of getting out of prison alive – escape – will have an effect similar to that of release. The 
possibility of escape from the Gulag diminished after 1934, when the Soviet secret police (NKVD) took over the 
whole of the camp and colony system. Nevertheless, archive data indicate that between 1934 and 1953, 378,375 
escapes were attempted; only 38 per cent of these succeeded, however (Getty et al, 1993, p.1041). 
37 Evidence shows varying release rates: over the period 1934-1952, they varied between 15 and 45 per cent of 
Gulag inmates. It seems realistic to bound the release rate in this way: but it is not essential to our argument. 
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Figure 1: Investment maximising equilibrium 
 
To complete the description of macroeconomic equilibrium one has to ask how wages will be 
determined. According to Skidelsky (1995, p.102), “The Stalinist command economy, 
instituted in the first five-year plan in 1929, came to be seen as a bold solution to the problem 
of extracting enough saving from the population to pay for rapid industrialisation…The key 
technical requirement was limiting the wages fund and the supply of consumer goods, thus 
freeing up investment resources”. What does this involve? The answer is simple enough:  
 
Proposition 2 The ‘technical requirement’ for limiting the wages fund so as to maximise 
investment is that the state act as monopsonist in the market for civilian labour.  
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That is to say L and w are chosen so as to maximize the surplus value available for the state (to 
invest in future growth, for example) consistent with the willingness of labour to work. As is 
shown in the Appendix, this implies that wages are forced down to their efficiency level and 
that the demand for labour is restricted so that the efficiency wage lies below the marginal 
product of labour. Specifically it is shown that  
sLwwF LL ++= **    (6) 
where FL indicates the marginal product of labour (shown as the curve MPL in the figure),    
is the increase in the efficiency wage as civilian employment increases; and s is the ‘surplus 
value’, if any, extracted from the prison population.
*
Lw
38 Thus the MPL must lie above NSC by 
two terms, the first measuring the impact of extra civilian employment on intra marginal costs, 
the second being the opportunity cost of civilian employment in terms of prisoner productivity. 
 
[This optimising condition can be expressed in terms of model parameters by differentiating 
the NSC with respect to p, and p with respect to L, to yield an Investment Maximising Curve 
which determines the level of civilian employment. From the definition of the NSC in equation 
(5) above and the definition of p it follows that  
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )22* /1/// qppeNqpLeLppwLLwL −==∂∂∂∂= ππ . 
With s = 0, setting the marginal cost of labour (paid at the efficiency wage) to match the 
marginal product of labour implies 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) qepreqppeqepreLwwF LL ///1// 22* πδγππδγ +−++=−++−++=+=  (7) 
Note that the marginal cost of labour, shown as the steeper curve labelled IMC in Figure 1(a), 
takes the same form as the NSC (the average cost), except that the parameter π is divided by p2 
instead of p.] 
                    
The nature of coercive equilibrium may be summarised as in Figure 1 where the intersection of 
the Investment Maximising Curve with the Marginal Product of Labour at point M determines 
the level of employment and production; and the wage is pushed down to lie on the No 
Shirking Constraint at point C. Since the Wages Fund is determined as the product of the real 
wage C and civilian employment LE, the remainder of output – the area above the real wage 
line – will be available for Investment. 
                                                 
38 If the Gulag was designed to be simply self-sustaining and no more, then s = 0. This is the ‘neutral’ assumption 
made in the algebra to follow. 
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 The steady-state nature of the equilibrium is indicated in the lower panel, where inflows to 
custody are measured as the rate of incarceration times the civilian labour force, ELπ , and 
‘outflows’ are given by releases and deaths times the custodial population, (ρ + δ)P, where the 
custodial population is P =N – LE, and the parameter ρ is treated as endogenous. 
 
This then is Stalin’s creation: a society where everyone works and substantial resources are 
generated either for investment or for military expenditure, whatever the dictator decides. No-
one is unemployed, but many are in prison. The state commands a goodly share of national 
resources, but wages are pushed down to efficiency levels. Ironically, the outcome for labour is 
as if it faced a greedy capitalist who wanted to maximise profits and had the monopsony power 
to do so. More than that, the employer can manipulate the living and working conditions for 
those not in civilian employment too. 
 
But there were problems. Labour demand driven by massive investment made it difficult to 
administer lower wages as long as workers could change jobs. As Acton and Stableford (2005, 
p.317) note: “Workers retained a rudimentary amount of autonomy and bargaining power … 
The effect was to compel managers to compete with each other to secure and retain labour … 
Certainly individual workers were subject to arbitrary mistreatment, but if the management of 
one factory was too heavy-handed, a worker could move on and sign up in another where the 
demands made on him or her were less exacting, wages higher, or conditions better”. The 
result was that, for a time, “there was a thriving labour market that moved workers from 
enterprise to enterprise, even when coercion was most intense” (Gregory and Harrison, 2005, 
p.748). As is clear from Figure 1 where the MPL exceeds the real wage, managers determined 
to fulfil production targets can poach labour from elsewhere by paying more than the 
administered wage, with soft budget constraints giving them the freedom to do so. 
 
In the tough labour laws of the late 1930s, Stalin circumscribed the freedom of labour to move 
from job to job. Thus was the pre-revolutionary prophecy of Karl Kautsky fulfilled. Writing 
about the class struggle in 1910, he had stated: “socialist production is irreconcilable with the 
full freedom of labour, that is with the freedom of the labourer to work when, where and how 
he wills”.39  
                                                 
39As cited in Nove (1991,p.210) and Skidelsky (1995, p.100).  
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5. Shifts of coercive equilibrium  
Making the Gulag harsher 
 
We have seen how investment is maximised conditional on a given standard of living in the 
Gulag. But what if the dictator can vary prison conditions as well?  Will he not be tempted to 
do whatever eases the incentive constraint? Indeed we find that:  
 
Proposition 3 Reducing the standard of living in the Gulag will reduce the efficiency wage, and   
increase the supply of investible funds.  
 
A derivation of this result is provided in the Appendix; and it can be seen clearly in Figure 
2(a), where increasing the harshness of life in the Gulag (reducing γ) lowers the intercept of 
NSC from A to A' and shifts labour market equilibrium from C to C'. 
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Figure 2: Harsher Gulag, more investment 
 
The fall of the efficiency wage obviously increases investible funds at the pre-existing level of 
production. But the corresponding cut of the IMC curve which determines hiring indicates that 
investible resources can be raised further by increasing civilian employment. With greater 
harshness of conditions in the Gulag, the dictator can pay less for labour yet increase civilian 
output.  
 
The logic of this section is as described by Gregory and Harrison (2005): to get more resources 
for investment or war, the actual wage must be compressed; and to avoid incentive problems 
the harshness of prison can be intensified. The end result is what Solzhenitsyn portrayed 
indelibly in One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.  
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The framework outlined here is, we believe, consistent with Sokolov’s (2003) view that the 
strategy adopted involved a time-varying mix of coercion, moral suasion, and material 
incentives. The availability of consumer goods to provide material incentives was limited by 
the emphasis placed on investment in heavy industry by Soviet economic planning. The first 
Five-Year Plan motivated workers during 1928-1933, with current low wages coupled with 
promises of a brighter future. The removal of ‘class enemies’ did not bring material rewards – 
indeed by reducing monitoring it imperilled production and called for a major change of 
policy. Stakhanovism during the mid-1930s encouraged ever greater individual productivity, 
but did not succeed in the aggregate. 
 
Like unemployment in the West, the prison system did have a rationale in terms of lowering 
incentive constraints on production. But does it provide an economic justification for the Great 
Terror? 
 
Increasing Terror 
Ronald Wintrobe (1998, Chapter 2) argues that while dictators may have enormous power, the 
lack of any agreed process for succession – and the consequent threat of assassination – 
typically induces paranoia. “The insecurity of the dictator results in excessive repression”, he 
observes, “Stalin is the classic modern example”. Janos Kornai (1992, p.362) and others have 
gone further to suggest that the Communist command economy was not so much a device for 
securing efficient production, rather a means of cementing the power of the dictator.   
 
A chilling political rationale for the Great Terror of 1937-1938 – in terms of maintaining a 
supportive constituency by large-scale elimination of ‘enemies’ – has recently been provided 
by Gregory et al (2006). How effective this proved in terms of cementing Stalin’s power is not 
something we investigate here. But what our model of incentives shows is that the creation of 
random terror on a massive scale cannot plausibly be attributed to economic objectives. This 
seems to accord with the facts. As Acton and Stableford (2005, p.386) observe: “If a major aim 
of the Great Terror was to overcome endemic waste and poor-quality production, to remedy the 
inherent malfunctions of the Stalinist form of ‘planning’, or to compel regional and local 
officials to obey Moscow to the letter, it … failed dismally”.  
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The Great Terror surely reduced the civilian labour force: but what of the effect on incentives? 
The logic used to see the effect of prison conditions leads to the conclusion that:   
 
Proposition 4 Random terror is economically counter-productive: increasing the rate of 
incarceration, the parameter π, will raise the prison population and the efficiency wage and 
reduce the investible surplus.  
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Figure 3: Greater terror, less investment 
 
Formal details are in the Appendix; but the essence of the argument is shown in Figure 3 where 
unleashing terror is captured by an increase in the parameter π (the perceived threat of random 
incarceration). The effect is to shift the common intercept of the NSC and IMC from A to A′, 
contracting the equilibrium level of production from B to B′, raising wages from E to E' and 
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reducing the surplus available for investment and growth. This effect is the opposite of that 
shown in the previous figure, where greater iron discipline in the Gulag increased the real 
resources available for investment.  
 
That Stalin was willing to sacrifice economic goals for increased political control seems clear 
from his enunciation of the infamous 5% rule. How could 95% false positives conceivably be 
justified in the name of economic efficiency? As the earlier citation from Wintrobe suggests, 
the unleashing of randomised terror and of incitements to widespread misreporting appear not 
as acts of labour discipline but as symptoms of paranoia and repression. 
 
This is consistent with the fact that, even before Stalin’s death, Lavrenty Beria (Stalin’s secret 
police chief) and his MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) were planning large scale 
modifications to the Gulag system. Tikhonov (2003) outlines various MVD plans, drawn up 
from around 1949 onwards, to convert Gulag sentences into exile to remote regions to work on 
MVD industrial and construction projects (at lower wages than free workers). Exiled ex-
prisoners would be allowed to bring their families and set up home. The aim of these proposals 
was not humanitarian, but was designed to meet production goals and reduce expenditure on 
prisons: at given levels of prison productivity, the population had become too large.40   
 
6. Why did Stalin’s coercive system collapse? 
 
Though it is not the object of this paper, it is tempting to look beyond Stalin’s years of power 
to see if the framework we use offers any clues as to why the system he created finally 
collapsed. To this end, we briefly compare the two systems, of Western capitalism and Soviet 
coercion, in terms of incentive constraints for labour, criteria for wage determination, and of 
demand management, see Figure 4 (where the labour force is normalised at N).  
 
                                                 
40 “The Gulag became a drain on the economy and the state budget as it filled with victims of the Great Terror and 
then with returning Soviet POWs. The 1953 amnesty derived primarily from the bureaucratic interests of the 
MVD itself. An external event – Stalin’s death – merely provided an excuse for the radical reform, which had 
been desired by the MVD and Gulag administration itself for many years” (Tikhonov, 2003, p.73). 
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Figure 4 Efficiency wage equilibria in Russia and in the West 
 
Shown in bold is the Russian case, with the No Shirking Constraint based on imprisonment. On 
the Marginal Product of Labour schedule, let the point M be where the marginal cost of 
labour41 matches its marginal productivity, defining the employment level LR for a dictator 
wishing to maximise the resources available to the state for investment, military spending, or 
whatever the dictator decrees. Only the lowest incentive-compatible level of wages will be 
paid: so the coercive equilibrium lies on the No Shirking Constraint, below M at point C, 
generating extra investible resources of MC times the volume of employment. 
 
In the Western case, with unemployment as a labour-discipline device, the incentive constraint 
is higher (as shown by the dotted line NSC'); and so too is labour productivity (MPL'). But we 
need to consider two possible equilibria, shown at D and B, depending on whether there is a 
demand constraint or not.  
 
We start in the 1930s with the West mired in the Great Depression, diagnosed by Keynes as 
demand failure. With a demand constraint (shown by the dotted vertical line in the figure ) 
                                                 
41 Shown as IMC in Figure 1, for example. 
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limiting the quantity of output that can be sold,42 let labour market equilibrium be at D, with 
high unemployment N – L' and wages depressed to the lowest incentive-compatible level. In 
this quantity-constrained equilibrium profits are maximised subject to a demand constraint, as 
would be consistent with weak labour unions.  
 
Point C symbolises Stalin’s contemporaneous experiment in coercion. How does it compare 
with what Western capitalism had to offer? The productivity of labour is lower than in the 
West due to the low initial level of capital per head in Russia at the beginning of 
industrialisation; and the compression of real wages is a sign of the effort to catch up with the 
West by rapid capital accumulation. Real wages are not high in either system, but the massive 
investment in Russia carries promises of a brighter future. Compared with the West in 
Depression, higher employment in Russia is relatively attractive for those in jobs: but for those 
not in jobs, the Gulag replaces the unemployment queue.  
 
Let time move forward some fifty years – to 1984 say, when Shapiro and Stiglitz publish their 
paper. Let the competitive equilibrium they describe represent the West after it has learnt the 
art of macroeconomic stabilisation: at B there is no demand failure; and output is maximised 
subject to the incentive constraint imposed by asymmetric information.43 How does Stalin’s 
system compare now? Assuming – as George Orwell had foretold – that Russia remains in  
equilibrium at C,  it  offers  lower wages, lower output – and widespread coercion. 
 
Figure 4 takes as given that labour productivity in the West continues to run ahead of that in 
Russia despite fifty years of squeezing consumption to release resources for investment and 
growth. Is this plausible? It would be if the resources so painfully extracted from the Russian 
people were not invested efficiently;44 and if the bureaucratic and centralised system based on 
fear failed to match the incentives in the West for innovation and continuous ‘technical 
progress’, as argued publicly by the Russian physicist Sakharov and colleagues, for example.45  
                                                 
42 As discussed at the end of Appendix 2. 
43 The use of the same MPL' curve is, of course, simply for convenience.   
44 “The system’s chief deficiency was the unprofitability of its investments. Although based on the principle of 
investing more of its national income than a capitalist society could achieve, the regime could not make enough 
from its investments to support itself” (Skidelsky, 1995, p.107) 
45 “It is no accident that all the great scientific and technological discoveries of recent times – quantum mechanics, 
new elementary particles, uranium fission, antibiotics, and most of the new, highly effective drugs, transistors, 
electronic computers, the development of highly productive strains in agriculture, the discovery of other 
components of the ‘Green Revolution’, and the creation of new technologies in agriculture, industry, and 
construction – all of them happened outside our country” Sakharov (1975, p.31). See also the 1970 Manifesto, 
Sakharov  (1974, Chap. 3). 
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 But the coercive system faces yet further  challenges. The spreading doctrine of Human Rights 
makes repression less acceptable, raising the efficiency wage in Russia46 ; and Western 
spending on an ambitious and expensive arms race gives the Russian government added reason 
to compress wages -  to pay for arms as well as investment47. With upward pressure on the 
efficiency wage and a strict limit on resources available for consumption, will the time not 
come when the incentive constraint is violated and the command economy collapses 
(everybody ‘shirks’)?  
 
6. Conclusions and qualifications 
At a time when Western economies were prostrated by mass unemployment, Stalin’s command 
economy achieved full employment. Though he may have been driven by the urge to challenge 
Western industrial supremacy, his methods owed little or nothing to Western ideas: Keynes 
had yet to write the General Theory (1936), for example. 
 
As command had cured unemployment, so it was expected to solve the problem of incentives: 
that is the logic of the model developed here as an exercise in positive economics. The 
approach we take, like Shapiro and Stiglitz’s capitalist equivalent, is brutally simplistic. It may 
lack the psychological subtlety of Akerlof and Yellen’s doctrine of fair wages; but it focuses 
clearly on the issue of incentives, and generates equilibria where coercion replaces cash as an 
incentive device. It would nevertheless be of interest to extend the analysis to allow for 
variable effort;48 and it should also be possible to combine both prison and unemployment as 
punishment devices.  
 
Coercion as a discipline device helped Russia to industrialise at high speed – and to produce 
the arms needed to defeat Hitler: but, like the French Revolution, the regime of punishment 
became a monster – with mass executions of those perceived to be enemies of the state. The 
archival data we draw on bear witness to the extent and longevity of the Gulag system 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
46 The shifting of production to the service sector, where monitoring is more difficult, will also have raised 
efficiency wages, as Harrison (2002) points out. 
47In the words of  Skidelsky (1995, p.111): “The command economy - the people -  had to be flogged even harder. 
But neo-Stalinist incentives no longer worked.” 
48 As Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) suggest, “Including effort as a continuous variable would not change the 
qualitative results” (p.435). 
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developed and sustained under Stalin’s dictatorship – and that is without taking into account 
settlements to contain more than two million kulaks.49  
 
Skidelsky (1995, p.103) argues that “the Stalinist command economy was not a technical 
solution to the economic problem of inadequate saving and investment: it was a device for 
maximising and perpetuating the power of the state”. Our analysis shows, however, that there 
is an economic rationale for a Gulag system as a labour-discipline device; and it shows that 
there were economic incentives to make it harsh. But the frenzy of punishment in the late 
1930s (and subsequent randomness in the application of coercive labour laws) cannot be 
rationalized on economic grounds. 
 
Stalin’s successors realised this, and the Gulag system and the harsh labour laws were 
dismantled soon after he died. How the command system survived for another quarter of a 
century is not something considered here. But a command economy will surely ‘fall apart’ 
when incentives fail: “Some scholars have argued that coercion was the glue that held the 
Stalinist economy together: when coercion failed, or was abandoned, the economy fell apart” 
(Gregory and Harrison, 2005, p.735). Was it the relative success of market economies – 
together with Star Wars and the spread of Human Rights – that finally destroyed the coercive 
system Stalin created? 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 Stalin’s youth as a street fighter in Georgia (Sebag Montefiore, 2007) lends credence to the idea that he saw 
brute force as tool of social policy. 
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Appendix 1: Custodial Population Data: sources and methods 
 
Year Prisons 
Labour 
colonies 
Labour 
camps 
Total 
custodial 
population 
1917    34,083 
1918    26,888 
1919    33,948 
1920    47,863 
1921    62,544 
1922    60,559 
1923    71,545 
1924    77,784 
1925    92,947 
1926    122,665 
1927    111,202 
1928    85,158 
1929    118,179 
1930    179,000 
1931    212,000 
1932    268,700 
1933    334,300 
1934   510,307 510,307 
1935  240,259 725,483 965,742 
1936  457,088 839,406 1,296,494 
1937  375,488 820,881 1,196,369 
1938 548,417 336,786 996,367 1,333,153 
1939 350,538 355,243 1,317,195 2,022,976 
1940 190,266 315,584 1,344,408 1,850,258 
1941 487,739 429,205 1,500,524 2,417,468 
1942 277,992 360,447 1,415,596 2,054,035 
1943 235,313 500,208 983,974 1,719,495 
1944 155,213 516,225 663,594 1,335,032 
1945 279,969 745,171 715,506 1,740,646 
1946 261,500 956,224 600,897 1,818,621 
1947 306,163 912,704 808,839 2,027,706 
1948 275,850 1,091,478 1,108,057 2,475,385 
1949  1,140,324 1,216,361 2,356,685 
1950  1,145,051 1,416,300 2,561,351 
1951  994,379 1,533,767 2,528,146 
1952  793,312 1,711,202 2,504,514 
1953  740,554 1,727,970 2,468,524 
1959    948,000 
 
Table A1: USSR custodial population, 1917-1953 
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Table A1: USSR custodial population, 1917-1953 
Sources: Total custodial population 1917-1934: http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2006/0239/tema07.php. Prisons, 
colonies and camps 1934-1953: Getty et al (1993). Settlements: Bacon (1992). 1959: Sokolov (2003), from 
V.N.Zemskov, Ukaz. Soch., p.15. 
Notes: Total custodial population does not include those in labour settlements, as is usual in the literature. Figures 
for the prison population relate to January 15 except for 1938, which refers to February 10. The 1938 prison figure 
is taken from a note to the Table in Appendix (a) of Getty et al (1993). Figures for labour colony and camp 
populations refer to January 1. The 1938 “colonies” figure here subtracts 548,417 from the figure given in Getty et 
al (1993), as the latter included those in prison. We note that the 1942 colonies figure is 1,000 lower than that 
previously given by similar sources (tabulated in Bacon, 1992); this also affects the total custodial population 
estimate for 1942. Many of these figures have been widely cited since; for example, Overy (2004). 
Data on the population of Soviet labour camps and colonies, labour settlements, and prisons were made available 
during glasnost’ from the Soviet Central State Archive. The Russian researchers who originally searched the 
Archive for the data were A. N. Dugin and V. N. Zemskov. Dugin’s figures were published in Western journals 
by Bacon (1992); these figures were checked by Zemskov, and found to be quite accurate. Zemskov’s figures 
were released in Getty et al (1993). The Archival data are not without controversy (see Ellman, 2002, for a 
measured discussion). Authors such as Robert Conquest (eg 1994) and Stephen Rosefielde (eg 1995) have 
objected that the Archive figures are too low. In comparison, their own figures derived from anecdotal and 
personal experience of those in and around the camps would suggest that several times as many people went 
through the Gulag system. Nevertheless, we agree with previous arguments that the camp authorities had no 
incentive to run false accounts, and we also note the reported internal consistency of Archival documents (see eg 
Getty et al, 1993). 
The first column shows the rather sparse data available on the numbers incarcerated in prisons, as opposed to 
labour camps. Prison was generally used only on a temporary basis: following an arrest, an individual would 
generally pass through prison for investigation and interrogation. More often than not, this led to a conviction. 
Most convicts were sent to camps or colonies to serve out their sentences (Getty et al, 1993, p.1019). 
Labour settlements housed kulaks – those rich peasants fortunate enough to have escaped with their lives after the 
forced collectivisation after 1929. Settlements were generally in remote inhospitable places, and involved (albeit 
relatively loosely) supervised compulsory labour related to settlement-building, such as agriculture, heavy 
industry and tree-felling (Overy, 2004). We will follow standard practice in excluding those in settlements from 
the custodial population of interest. From the point of view of labour discipline, settlements did not perform the 
same function as camps and colonies, in that the average worker faced no risk of being sent to a settlement. 
Labour camps had existed under the Tsars. Under the new Bolshevik regime, in July 1918 a new system of 
approximately 300 camps was set up by the Cheka secret police (Overy, 2004) to house political offenders 
(although by the middle of 1919 the camps were receiving criminal as well as political convicts – Solomon, 1980, 
p.200). Camps were initially intended to be economically self-sufficient, with prisoners working to pay for their 
own upkeep (but not on jobs for the state). The labour was hard – but could be refused by leftist political prisoners 
– and conditions were harsh. In addition to the camps, from 1919, the Commissariat of Justice ran a system of 
labour colonies for prisoners convicted of petty crimes with sentences of less than three years. Conditions in the 
colonies were less harsh, resembling open prisons; often prisoners worked alongside criminals sentenced to labour 
duty but not incarcerated. 
The end of the civil war in 1922 brought the merging of the administration of the camps and colonies. The Cheka 
(OGPU) retained a small network of camps, primarily in the north, to house political opponents. Numbers of 
prisoners in camps and colonies rose steadily, from around 30,000 in the early Bolshevik years to over 100,000 in 
1926-7. Solomon (1980, p.202) estimates that the (Solovki) camp detainees in 1927-28 accounted for between 10 
and 15 per cent of the total camp and colony population.  
The annual figures mask quite substantial fluctuations in inflow rates within years. Bacon (1992, p.1077) cites the 
case of a particular year. As Table 1 shows, in January 1942 there were 1,776,043 incarcerated in camps and 
colonies,50 a decline of more than 200,000 compared to the camp population of 1,929,729 recorded a year earlier 
in January 1941. But this decline hides a rise and subsequent fall during 1941: at the start of the Great Patriotic 
War on 22 June, the camp population was recorded as 2,300,000 – so during 1941 there was a rise of around 
400,000 then a decline of more than half a million. 
                                                 
50 This figure (taken from Getty et al, 1993) is 1,000 less than that given in Bacon (1992). 
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Figure A1: Release and admission rates, 1934-1947 
Notes: Release rate = releases / Gulag population. Admission rate = admissions / employment. 
 
Year 
Release rate 
(%) 
Admission rate 
(%) 
1934 28.9 0.9 
1935 29.1 0.7 
1936 44.0 0.8 
1937 44.4 1.0 
1938 28.1 1.2 
1939 17.0 0.6 
1940 23.6 0.8 
1941 41.6 1.2 
1942 36.0 1.0 
1943 34.2 0.6 
1944 22.9 0.5 
1945 47.1 0.5 
1946 19.3 0.6 
1947 24.1 0.9 
1948 23.6  
1949 14.7  
1950 15.3  
1951 16.6  
1952 19.3  
1953 54.2  
Table A2: Release and admission rates, 1934-1947 
Sources: Admissions: Bacon (1994). Releases: Getty et al (1993). Employment: Moorsteen and Powell (1966). 
Custodial population: See Table 1. 
Notes: Release rate is releases as a proportion of the prison population as at 1 January in the relevant year. The 
particularly high release rates during 1941-1945 are in part explained by releases to the armed forces. Of the 1.956 
million released during that time, Getty et al (1993, p.1040) state that 975,000 were released to military service 
(particularly to punitive or ‘storm’ units, which suffered the heaviest casualties). However, political prisoners 
were generally barred from release to the army (Getty et al, 1993). 
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Year 
Counter-
revolutionaries
Counter-
revolutionaries 
as % of camp 
population 
1934 135,190 26.5 
1935 118,256 16.3 
1936 105,849 12.6 
1937 104,826 12.8 
1938 185,324 18.6 
1939 454,432 34.5 
1940 444,999 33.1 
1941 420,293 28.0 
1942 407,988 28.8 
1943 345,397 35.1 
1944 268,861 40.5 
1945 283,351 39.6 
1946 333,833 55.6 
1947 427,653 52.9 
1948 416,156 37.6 
1949 420,696 34.6 
1950 578,912 40.9 
1951 475,976 31.0 
1952 480,766 28.1 
1953 465,256 26.9 
 
Table A3: Political prisoners in labour camps, 1934-1953 
Source: Getty et al (1993). 
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Appendix 2: Unemployment as a discipline device  
The approach of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) is to treat a job as an asset, whose value can be 
enhanced by shirking but only at the risk of being fired. Consider the simplest version where 
being caught shirking leads to permanent unemployment. In this ‘dire punishment’ case, real 
income will fall from w to w , the level of unemployment benefit, for ever. For incentive 
reasons the efficiency wage, w, has to be (at least) such that the saving of effort, e, by shirking 
matches the expected loss of welfare through becoming unemployed, i.e. 
( rwewqe /−−= )       (A1) 
where q is the hazard rate of detection and ( ) rwew /−−  is the value of a job (capitalised at 
the interest rate r). 
Solving for the efficiency wage with dire punishment, we find 
qrewewd /++=       (A2)  
What if there is an exogenous probability of job loss, at the rate bdt, due to the flux of changing 
product demand, for example: how does this affect the efficiency wage? Since the job is likely 
to disappear anyway, its value is less. Increasing the rate of discount from r to r + b, valuing a 
job at ( ) ( brwew +−− / ), substituting into (A1) and solving implies 
( ) qebrwew /+++=    (A3) 
So random break-ups increase the efficiency wage.  
Such random inflows into unemployment will, in steady state, need to be matched by outflows. 
The authors assume that unemployment is temporary, with access to jobs from the state of 
unemployment at the rate of adt; and the unemployed are effectively anonymous with no 
stigma attached to having been fired for shirking. The effect of incorporating re-entry to 
employment is to further increase the rate of discount on the RHS of equation (A1) so that the 
efficiency wage becomes   
( ) qebarwew /++++=         (A4) 
The dynamics of unemployment are such that unemployment will increase if the number of 
break-ups bL exceeds the number of jobs obtained a(N – L), since 
( )LNabLu −−=& . 
In steady state equilibrium where inflows into unemployment match outflows, the rate of job 
access and break-up must satisfy the condition that  
( )ubau −= 1  
where u denotes the unemployment rate.  
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For given values of b and a, unemployment would be increasing to the right of L in Figure A1 
and decreasing to the left of L. In deriving the NSC, however, SS assume that a is endogenous 
and will adjust to support any given b. This means it has to rise without limit to enable 
stationary states with very low unemployment. The rate of job acquisition will be very rapid at 
low rates of unemployment. As this means that the punishment involved in unemployment is 
vanishingly small, the NSC goes off to infinity when unemployment is low. 
Since this implies  
ubba /=+ , the efficiency wage they derive for capitalism is  
( ) qeubrwew //+++=         (A5) 
This has the property that the efficiency wage goes to infinity as u falls to zero: the access rate 
has to increase sharply to satisfy the equilibrium conditions just described, so unemployment 
becomes vanishingly transitory. 
Figure 1 shows the NSC curve, along with marginal product of labour (MPL) curve and the 
equilibrium NSC=MPL condition.51 The Figure also shows the quit rate b and job acquisition 
rate a; at the stationary equilibrium, ( )buau −= 1 . In the case of dire punishment, 
unemployment is permanent, so a = 0. 
Note that, if the incentive conditions are satisfied, the pool of unemployed acts as a credible 
threat. In equilibrium there are no shirkers among the unemployed. 
 
                                                 
51 The level of output is the area under the MPL curve to the left of B.  
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Real wage
Figure A2: The Shapiro-Stiglitz model, including ‘dire punishment’ 
 
 
This model is implicitly developed for an economy not suffering from demand failure (so it is 
reasonable to talk about high-employment equilibria on the MPL curve). But in the 1930s, at 
the time when the USSR had eliminated unemployment, western free-market economies were 
suffering from mass unemployment and substantial disequilibrium in the labour market. One 
can appeal to the logic of ‘quantity-constrained’ economics to show this in Figure 1. Let 
employment be at L’ to the left of L, with the decline measured by the integral of MPL between 
L and L’, and the real wage lying somewhere between x and y, depending on the bargaining 
strength of employers and workers. Such a non-market-clearing equilibrium might be a better 
representation of the state of western economies at the time that Stalin’s experiment in 
coercion began. 
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Appendix 3: Derivation of Propositions 
Proposition 1 
In steady state equilibrium, with the prison population constant, the flow of random 
incarcerations must match the flow of those being released and dying in prison, so 
(1 ) ( )p pπ ρ δ− = +  
where p denotes the percentage of the workforce in prison and dtδ the death rate. 
Hence (1 ) /p pρ δ π= − + −   
and so / pρ π δ π+ = − +  . 
By treating ρ  as endogenous (subject to a maximum, ρ ), one may define a multiplicity of 
steady state equilibria. Substituting for ρ π+  in the equation defining the efficiency wage, 
namely: 
( )* /w e r e qγ ρ π= + + + +  
one obtains the result  
( ) ( ) qeprepw //* πδγ +−++=           
i.e. the efficiency wage falls as the proportion of the labour force in prison increases. 
 
Proposition 2 
The dictator’s problem can be written as 
( ) 0)(*  subject to  )(max ≥−− LwwwLLFf
L
 
where the objective is to maximise investible funds wLLF −)( , and the constraint is that 
wages satisfy the efficiency condition , where w*(L) the efficiency wage. )(* Lww ≥
Formally, the Lagrangian for this problem can be written as  
( ) ( ), ; , ( ) *( ) ( )L F L wL w w L s Nλ π γ λΛ = − + − + L−  
The First Order Conditions are 
/ 0w L λ∂Λ ∂ = − + = ; 
*/ 0L LL F w w sλ∂Λ ∂ = − − − =  
Since the objective is non-stationary in w, the Lagrange multiplier is positive ( 0Lλ = > ) 
and w w ; hence the FOC can be written: *( )L=
 s**L LF w Lw= − −
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Proposition 3 
As noted in deriving Proposition 2, the Lagrangian for this problem is  
( ) (, ; , ( ) *( ))L F L wL w w Lλ π γ λΛ = − + −  
where the Lagrange multiplier Lλ =  is the size of the civilian labour force. But the multiplier 
measures the rate of change of the optimal value of investible resources (the dictator’s 
objective) with respect to perturbations which ease the incentive constraint, i.e. with respect to 
alterations of parameters that affect the efficiency wage. (See Madden (1986) for further 
discussion of the ‘envelope theorem’ being used here.) 
But with the efficiency wage determined as ( ) ( ) qepreLw //* πδγ +−++=  and 
* / 1w γ∂ ∂ = ,  increases in γ  will tighten the incentive constraint and lower the objective, i.e. 
/ ( / *)( * / )w w 0γ γ λ∂Λ ∂ = ∂Λ ∂ ∂ ∂ = − < . 
Per contra the objective will increase if γ  is reduced, i.e. investible resources will be 
decreasing in living standards in the Gulag. 
 
Proposition 4 
This is another application of the envelope theorem. As noted in discussing Proposition 3, the 
Lagrangian for this problem is decreasing in the efficiency wage which is determined as 
( ) ( ) qepreLw //* πδγ +−++= . Since * / 0w π∂ ∂ > , investible resources will be decreasing 
in the extent of randomised terror, i.e. / * ( / *)( * / ) 0w w w π∂Λ ∂ = ∂Λ ∂ ∂ ∂ < . 
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